

# **EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT** **ROUTING SLIP**

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC				
17	C/ACIS		X		
18	NIO/SP		X		
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SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks

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Executive Secretary  
15 Jan 86  
Date

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

WASHINGTON

Jan 13<sup>th</sup>

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

Executive Registry	
86-	0150

Bill:

Per our discussion over lunch  
last week, attached are my views  
on what we should do about  
Soviet cheating.

I do hope you agree.

Best,

Ken

d-119-IR

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## UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

January 10, 1986

OFFICE OF  
THE DIRECTOR

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Comments on RSVP II

DOD had a tough task: to identify militarily significant and budgetarily feasible responses to the pattern of Soviet violations. Even so, I believe that the report falls considerably short. It does not provide sufficient justification for the programs it recommends, some of which raise serious questions. Nor do the recommended programs provide "incentives to the Soviets to correct their non-compliance", "respond forcefully" or "entail real penalties" -- even though these are, in Secretary Weinberger's words, the standards to meet.

Any programmatic responses will cost us and that cost needs to be weighed against long-term benefits. We need to examine a much wider range of alternatives. We are actively looking at such alternatives in ACDA.

In examining more options, we should not limit ourselves solely to questions of the military significance of Soviet violations. Rather, we should also examine the impact that continuing Soviet violations -- and our failure to respond effectively -- will have on arms control as an important national security tool and on the future of US-Soviet relations. This could be a study under your General Advisory Committee on Arms Control or even an outside, high-level bipartisan panel reporting to you like the Scowcroft Commission.

Besides that, we should also consider whether to alter our SALT II interim restraint policy itself. Why? First, Soviet violations have continued unabated for two-plus years. Arms control cannot endure on a double standard. Second, SALT II would have expired anyway on December 31st, and we have been bound to it only as a matter of policy, not as a matter of law. The longer we feel bound by it past that date, the more the treaty becomes yours rather than President Carter's, and the harder it will become to change your policy.

Therefore, we should consider deciding and announcing that we will no longer consider ourselves bound by SALT II as long as the Soviets continue to violate it -- adding that the U.S. has "gone the extra mile" (as you pledged last summer) but that the Soviet violations of SALT II continue. We would need to come up with effective programmatic responses to complement this approach, to avoid its being a hollow gesture.

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Such a change in policy now would surely be exploited by the Soviets and evoke considerable negative responses in Congress and from our Allies. This might adversely affect some of our defense programs on the Hill, but I believe Gramm-Rudman will be the major determining factor there. The Allied aspect weighs less heavily on me, because the Allies so far have given only lukewarm support to our concerns about Soviet violations and the Allies fairly consistently fail to support us on major issues like Libya and Central America.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Ken", with a stylized flourish at the end.

Kenneth L. Adelman

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